The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been working for more than seven years now to discipline overfishing subsidies, as mandated by the global community, without success. I argue that this failure is partly because WTO negotiators aim for an all-inclusive deal, i.e. negotiations are conducted as a "single undertaking", whereby results must be achieved in all areas. Negotiators are required to broker an all-inclusive deal for all maritime WTO member countries and for all fisheries, whether domestic or international; small or large scale; developing or developed country fisheries. It is argued here that this commitment to a "single undertaking" does not align the incentive to remove subsidies with national interests, and therefore needs to be changed by splitting the world's fisheries into domestic and international fisheries. In this way, the battle for eliminating overfishing subsidies for some stocks would shift to home countries, and for others this would still rest with the international community. This split, it is argued, would align the incentives and improve the chances of eliminating overfishing subsidies.
Introduction
The practice by governments of providing financial support, whether direct or indirect, to the fishing sector, is known as fisheries subsidies. Since a back-of-the-envelope calculation by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 1993) revealed that the total amount of fisheries subsidies paid out annually by maritime countries globally in the early 1990s could be over US$50 billion, eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies has become a central issue in the quest to achieve sustainable fisheries worldwide. More recent detailed studies put this number at from US$15 -27 billion (Milazzo, 1998; Sumaila et al., 2010a) . This is a substantial amount, given that the total gross revenue from the world's fisheries is estimated at between US$80 -85 billion (FAO, 2011) .
There is a strong connection between fisheries governance, sustainable development, and how subsidies serve as a stumbling block for meeting sustainability goals (e.g. Clark et al., 2005; von Moltke, 2010) . Subsidies that lead to overcapacity and overfishing are known as "harmful", "bad", or "capacity enhancing" (Appendix 1).
Despite the significant amount of effort devoted to identifying and measuring fisheries subsidies and to analysing their potential and actual impacts on environmental and economic sustainability over the past decades (e.g. Heymans et al., 2011) , there has been little progress in formulating an international regime for the regulation of fisheries subsidies. Negotiations to discipline fisheries subsidies at the World Trade Organization (WTO) have stalled in recent years and considerable challenges remain before a meaningful agreement can be attained. In this contribution, a key challenge to the WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies is identified, and possible solutions to the problem offered.
In the next three sections and the appendices to the paper, I draw on earlier work by my collaborators and me to provide background to fisheries subsidies. This is then followed by my proposed solutions and a conclusion.
The scope and size of fisheries subsidies globally
Determining the amount of subsidies paid by maritime countries to their fishing sector is difficult because of the lack of access to reliable and consistent information on fisheries subsidies programs. Also, there is little consistency in definition, data source or methodology across the estimates in many maritime countries. As a result, estimates of the magnitude of government subsidies to the sector are highly variable.
The first global estimate of fisheries subsidies was provided by the FAO (1993) , which was calculated simply by deducting the estimated global total fishing cost from the total revenue to arrive at a global estimated annual fisheries subsidy of US$, billion. Milazzo (1998) found that annual fisheries subsidies were in the range of US$ 11 -20 billion per year, which was nearly 20% of the landed gross revenues of global fisheries. At the regional level, a study by a major international accounting firm conducted for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation estimated subsidies by its members at US$ 8.9 billion (APEC, 2000) while the OECD estimated annual fisheries subsidies of US$ 6.4 billion (OECD, 2010) for its member countries. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF), using subsidies reported by APEC, OECD and WTO members, concludes that officially reported subsidies were US$13 billion per year in 2001, and concluded that the actual global yearly total was at least US$ 15 billion, and very possibly higher (WWF, 2001) .
Following on their earlier publications (e.g. Khan et al., 2006; Sumaila and Pauly, 2006) , Sumaila et al. (2010a) estimated total subsidies to fisheries worldwide to be from US$ 25 -29 billion a year (Table 1) . Using the classification of subsidies described in Appendix 1, the authors concluded that US$ 16 billion, or about 60% of the global subsidies, can be classified as "capacity enhancing", while another US$ 3 billion can be classified as "ambiguous" subsidies (see Appendix 1 for definitions of subsidy types). These estimates show that the developed countries jointly account for nearly 70% of the global fisheries subsidies and 65% of the "capacity enhancing" subsidies.
Although there are large differences between the various estimates of fisheries subsidies, all studies conclude that the scale of fisheries subsidies is considerable, given that the total value of global fisheries (i.e. landed value of the marine fisheries catches) is reported to be around US$ 85 billion per year .
Impacts of fisheries subsidies
Fisheries subsidies have an impact on the profits of fishing enterprises by either increasing their revenues (e.g. income or price support) or reducing their costs (e.g. government funding of vessel construction and maintenance, or provision of fuel tax exemptions) (Sumaila, 2003) . Whilst the effects of subsidies on resources will depend on the type of the fisheries management regimes, as well as on the state of the fish stocks (Hannesson, 2001 , OECD, 2006 , UNEP, 2011 , many such subsidies act as perverse economic incentives, encouraging fisheries industries to overinvest in themselves.
In open access fisheries, where entry into fisheries is not restricted, subsidies that improve the profitability will lead to overcapitalization and overexploitation (Munro and Sumaila, 2002) . In the absence of effective control of fishing effort, the abnormal profit generated by subsidies will encourage reinvestment into the fishery, as fishing enterprises compete to capture a greater share of the abnormal profit, until it is dissipated through a combination of reduced catch and increased cost. Hence, subsidies in open access fisheries can be considered both unsustainable in both economic and resource terms.
Effective controls of catch in the form of a total allowable catch (i.e. regulated open access fisheries) can mitigate the overfishing effect of fisheries subsidy programs. Nevertheless, subsidies to such management regimes, lacking effective controls of fishing effort, will likely lead to fleet overcapacity, commonly manifesting in the gross shortening of fishing seasons (Munro and Sumaila, 2002) . Some consequences of this "race to fish" include reductions in price due to flooding of the market, inferior quality of catches and overcapacity in the processing facilities to cope with highly seasonal peaks in fish supplies. Again, such programs cannot be considered economically sustainable. Moreover, overinvestment in a fishery caused by subsidies may lead to greater industry pressure to increase the caps on the total catch, potentially to levels beyond what would be considered biologically sustainable.
Assuming perfect enforcement, the negative effects of fisheries subsidies can be eliminated. However, in reality, perfect enforcement is rarely, if ever, achieved. Furthermore, from society's standpoint, the introduction of subsidies into fisheries distorts economic incentives and attracts human and other resources into an industry where they yield a lower return than they would if they were employed in other sectors of the economy (Sumaila and Hannesson, 2010) . Provisions of subsidies, therefore, represent a new welfare loss to society, even in the presence of effective management (Cox and Sumaila 2010) .
In the international arena, the effects of fisheries subsidies have been perceived in general trade distortion terms, whereby subsidies to the industries targeting the international market can harm unsubsidized industries in other countries by distorting their market competitiveness. Given that a large proportion of the global catch is traded internationally (FAO, 2011) , such effects exist in fisheries. Moreover, with regard to shared and straddling stocks, the overfishing effects of subsidized fleets may cause considerable harm to the economic performance of unsubsidized fleets at the production level by reducing the biological productivity of the jointly targeted stocks (i.e. "production-distorting effects").
Fisheries subsidies negotiations at the WTO
The Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO, 2001 ) launched the Doha Round in 2001, which described the mandate for negotiations over fisheries subsidies. This in turn marked the first effort by the international trade organization to address conservation of resources in a key natural resource sector using trade related disciplines. This unique conservation aspect of the negotiation mandate was unfamiliar to the WTO because until then the institution dealt with trade-related issues almost exclusively. For several reasons, a consensus began to emerge for acceptance of the conservation mandate of the negotiations by 2004. First, the identification of the Doha Round as a "development" Round, emphasizing the need to address developing country issues, resulted in an increasing number of developing countries getting actively involved in the negotiations on fisheries subsidies, thus broadening the discussion beyond issues promoted by the established coalitions of predominantly developed countries (Swartz and Sumaila, in press ).
Second, the internal dialogue within the European Union, particularly following the expiration of the existing EU Common Fisheries Policy, spurred the re-examination of EU fisheries policies, including restructuring of its subsidies program, and led to the adjustment of the EU's position to accept the need for WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations.
Third, the acceptance of a fish stock conservation mandate by the EU, Japan and China, among others, paved the way for more explicit language in the 2005 Hong Kong Declaration (WTO, 2005b) . The new Declaration stated that the negotiations for strengthening disciplines on fisheries subsidies should include "the prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and over-fishing", whilst adopting appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing countries taking into account the importance of fisheries to "development priorities, poverty reduction, and livelihood and food security concerns" in these countries.
The Hong Kong mandate fundamentally altered the dynamics of the fisheries subsidies negotiations. The focus of the negotiations shifted from defining the scope of the negotiation to identifying the types of subsidies to be included in the ensuing prohibition. The formulation of the nature of the special and differential treatments for developing countries also became central. With regard to the breadth of the prohibition, the discussion revolved around the so-called "top-down versus bottom-up" debate. The "Friends of Fish" coalition argued for a comprehensive list of prohibited subsidies, which includes most fisheries subsidy programs (i.e. "top-down"), to be circumscribed by a limited list of exceptions targeting programs aimed at improving fisheries management and surveillance as well as active capacity reduction (WTO, 2004) .
Meanwhile, a group led by Japan, Korea and Taiwan argued that only some subsidies programs can be associated with overcapacity and overfishing, insisting that fisheries subsidies are damaging only in poorly managed fisheries and, therefore, the prohibition should be applied only in the absence of proper management (WTO, 2005a) . Issues with this argument include how is "proper management" defined and who is to decide when a country has it? Still, this argument made the WTO focus on identifying the types of subsidy programs that can be beneficial in addressing the development needs of developing countries while instituting conditions under which the special and differential treatments are granted to avoid abuse.
The Hong Kong Declaration also opened a period of negotiations centred on the legal language of the resulting agreement, with many countries proposing various versions of legal texts. While the proposals and negotiations did not yield significant convergences on major issues, by 2007, following a brief suspension of the Doha Round in 2006, the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules was asked to prepare a draft of proposed rules for fisheries subsidies (see Appendix 2 for key elements of the Chair's draft).
Due to renewed calls for "deliverables" on the Doha Round by the G20 and APEC leaders in late 2010, the WTO delegations and Secretariat engaged in a period of intense negotiations in early 2011. The goal of these discussions was to produce revised legal texts to be submitted for possible confirmation at the next round of Ministerial meetings to be held by the end of 2011. The initiative led to a proliferation of proposals in the fisheries subsidies negotiations, with eight new proposals being submitted by different coalitions of WTO member countries in the span of three months, making a total of 14 proposals if the six proposals submitted in 2010 are taken into account. Highlights of some of the proposals and discussions on key issues are presented in Appendix 3, which provides some insights into the nature of such negotiations.
In the end, three months of negotiations in early 2011 saw minimal convergences in key issues with delegates offering little room for compromise. The Negotiating Group Chair concluded that he is not in a position to present a revised legal text on the subject as was mandated and instead produced a report that summarized the state of the negotiations (WTO, 2011a).
With the preceding as background and context, I next focus on how the requirement that the WTO negotiations are conducted as a "single undertaking" is a key challenge that has hindered the ability of the negotiations to succeed.
Challenges to and solutions for the WTO negotiations
There are obviously several challenges to the WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies, but a key reason for the lack of progress in these negotiations, after seven years of trying, is that the negotiations suffer what is termed herein as the "lumpiness" problem. By this I mean negotiators aim for an all-inclusive deal or no deal at all. This problem is manifested in two ways.
First, the WTO negotiations are conducted as a "single undertaking", meaning that a breakthrough in the negotiations on fisheries subsidies must be coupled with similar breakthroughs in the negotiations on the Doha Round as a whole. The fact that this requirement constituted a problem for the negotiation was recognized during the later stages of the stalled negotiations, leading to an unsuccessful last minute attempt to decouple fisheries subsidies negotiations from the others in the Round. This decoupling is needed if progress in the negotiations is to be made.
The second problem, first mentioned in Sumaila (2012) , relates to the goal of negotiators to arrive at a deal on subsidies that is all-inclusive, for all fisheries of the world, domestic or international, small or large scale, etc. This approach, has limited the ability of the negotiations to make progress by confounding the issues. To overcome this second problem, we might start splitting the world's fisheries into (i) domestic (i.e. fisheries that operate within a country's EEZ and target fish stocks that spend all their lives within the EEZ); and (ii) international fisheries, made up of fish stocks that do not qualify as domestic fisheries as defined herein. Thus, they consist of (a) transboundary fish stocks, i.e. stocks that are shared by two or more countries because they spend their lives within the EEZs of these countries; (b) highly migratory stocks such as tunas that straddle the EEZs of countries and the high seas; and (c) discrete high seas stocks that spend all their lives in the high seas.
There are at least three reasons why the above split is necessary to help move WTO negotiations forward. First, the incentives for countries to eliminate harmful or overfishing subsidies differs significantly depending on whether a fishery is domestic or Disciplining subsidies international; and within the latter, whether a fishery is a transboundary, highly migratory or discrete high seas stock (see below). Second, the institutional framework needed to support the elimination of harmful subsidies differs from that needed for domestic fisheries. For example, in the case of domestic fisheries, the heavy lifting has to be done on the home front. However, for highly migratory stock international fisheries, a coordinated international framework is needed, because unilateral action by one country is not likely to eliminate the problem of overfishing . Thirdly, by dividing fisheries into these groups, it would be easier to identify and focus on what needs to be done to eliminate harmful subsidies.
Disciplining harmful subsidies to domestic fisheries
The incentives for countries are clear here: if a country depletes its domestic fish stock, it would suffer the consequences, as Canada learnt the hard way with the collapse of the cod stock off Newfoundland in 1992. Hence, the battlefront for eliminating, or at least redirecting harmful subsidies for domestic fisheries, should rightly be at home in individual countries. The key to success here is to make it abundantly clear to fishing countries that it is in their best interest to divert harmful subsidies from helping to diminish their fisheries stock (capital) into more constructive uses. Countries could use the resources in a number of innovative ways to help their fishers to adapt to the elimination of harmful subsidies. Recent innovative approaches that have been floated include "fishing for plastic" instead of fishing for vulnerable fish stocks and 'trawling for data' instead of fish. Countries that divert their harmful subsidies to provide skills to fishers to help them transition to more sustainable livelihoods would see win-win benefits in the sense that they keep the money in the fishing communities while reducing the pressure to deplete a renewable food source.
An important role for (local) fisheries scientists and managers is to help countries understand the harm caused by these subsidies, and the immense benefits that could follow the elimination of harmful subsidies. Once countries, especially developing ones, realized that the benefits of taking action now for their country are large, and that this is the best way to improve the quality of life of their coastal communities in the medium to long term, they would begin to take action to mobilize the resources, currently used to provide harmful subsidies, in ways that would ensure the sustainability of fisheries rather than their depletion.
The Norway story on subsidies should serve as a good example here. In the early 1970s, the country was a big provider of subsidies to its fledging fisheries industry. The country provided both price support and cost-reducing subsidies that were clearly bad for the sustainability of the resource and, therefore also bad for the medium to long term benefits to the country's fishing sector (Cox and Sumaila, 2010) . By the mid 1980s, the country realized that harmful subsidies are ultimately bad for the fish and the fishers, and quickly reduced subsidies to almost nothing, with good results to show in both biological and economic terms (Cox and Sumaila, 2010) .
In this framework, the international community, through institutions such as the WTO, FAO, and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and regional intergovernmental bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), African Union (AU) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) could provide guidelines and incentives to help countries implement their home-grown plans to discipline harmful subsidies of their domestic fisheries.
Disciplining harmful subsidies to international fisheries
Here, the incentives are less clear and more complicated: if a country subsidizes and overfishes a highly migratory fish stock, the country enjoys the benefit of doing so while the negative consequences of overfishing the stock are suffered by many countries . As a result of this asymmetric nature of the distribution of cost and benefits, the battleground for eliminating harmful subsidies is at the international level-at the level of the WTO, for example.
The trick here is to identify the low-hanging fruit, i.e., international fisheries that would be relatively easy to achieve an agreement, while at the same time giving high conservation benefits. The negotiations could then begin with these. An immediate example that comes to mind is high and deep-sea fish stock fisheries. For these international fisheries, the biology, economics, social and food security, legal and current management regimes indicate that they are low-hanging fruit, because it would be very difficult to argue for their subsidization using any of these arguments. Ecologically, high and deep-sea fish stocks are known to have life history characteristics that make them vulnerable to overfishing. In addition, the legal and management structures associated with them are weak, to say the least (Norse et al., 2012) . These fisheries are operated by a few mostly developed countries, producing a small percentage of the world's total capture fisheries catch, while employing only a few people (e.g. Norse et al., 2012) . It has been estimated that, without subsidies, much of the bottom trawl fleet operating in the high seas would not be economically viable (Sumaila et al., 2010b) . In effect, the production-distorting effects of fisheries subsidies are most pronounced in high seas fisheries. Thus, obtaining a WTO agreement on these fisheries would be a significant win for conservation and sustainability, without significant cost to the global community.
Conclusion
The battlefront dealing with harmful subsidies to international fisheries remains in the international community via its institutions such as the WTO. This is because of the asymmetry in the distribution of costs and benefits of providing subsidies by country. Implementing the proposal will not be easy, as more details need to be worked out. For example, we need to determine which fisheries in a country can be classified as domestic and which as international, and it is not clear how performance of countries would be monitored under the new proposal. Still, the principles behind the proposal are clear: in order to succeed in disciplining these subsidies, align the effort to discipline harmful subsidies with the interest of fishing nations, and take the battle to the right front -the home country in the case of domestic fisheries, and the international arena in the case of international fisheries.
Funding I acknowledge the support of the Global Ocean Economics Project funded by the author's Pew Fellowship for Marine Conservation. I also thank Conservation international for their support. subsidies affecting fishing on "unequivocally overfished stocks" (i.e. overfished without any doubt). At the same time, it allowed subsidy programs aimed at assisting adoption of vessel safety and sustainable fishing practices, as well as capacity-reducing programs such as vessel buybacks and fisher re-education, provided these programs did not contribute to a net increase in fishing capacity. Moreover, the Draft addressed the issue of the productiondistorting effects of subsidies on jointly exploited stocks by enabling countries to challenge any subsidies that are deemed to be causing adverse effects on any stocks in which disputing countries have an "identifiable" interest under international law.
For developing countries, the Chair's Draft recognized the following exceptions as "special and differential treatment": † full exception for least-developed countries; † full exception (except for programs affecting overfished stocks) for artisanal fisheries defined as inshore fisheries operating nonmechanical gear with minimal commercial relationships; † partial exception (including subsidies for vessel acquisition and modification and on operating costs) for small-scale fisheries with vessels ,10 m; † exceptions for vessel modification subsidies on domestic fisheries operating within the Exclusive Economic Zones, provided that prior scientific stock assessments show that the fishing capacity does not exceed a sustainable level.
These exceptions, apart from those provided to least-developed countries, require the subsidizing countries to maintain a fisheries management system meeting certain international standards, including possible involvement of the FAO in a peer review process, and notification of all programs to the WTO secretariat. The responses to the Chair's Draft were mixed. It was applauded by the "Friends of Fish" countries, and strongly endorsed by environmental organizations, including the WWF, which describes it as containing "the necessary elements of success" (WWF, 2007) . Meanwhile, other countries expressed their disappointment with the approach taken in the Draft, namely with what they perceived as the Chair's attempt to artificially generate convergences despite lack of such convergence. Nonetheless, the text was widely embraced as a basis for continuing negotiations, and almost all of the subsequent proposals by members were submitted as amendments to the text. latter stage of the negotiation, with opponents of such an exception countering that fishing activities in the high seas are highly industrialized operations and should, therefore, face the same subsidy rules as all other high seas fleets.
Several proposals put forward by the coalition of small and vulnerable economies (SVEs) and Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) argued that due to the relatively small scale of their fisheries, contributions by these countries to global overcapacity and overfishing are negligible (WTO, 2008b; WTO, 2010f; WTO, 2011h) . These proposals, therefore, seek to exempt from the prohibition countries with a total marine fisheries catch below a specified threshold, e.g. less than 0.1% of the global total. In addition, there were proposals submitted by Morocco (WTO, 2010d), Ecuador and Peru (WTO, 2011e) , and Malaysia (WTO, 2011c), the objectives of which were to clarify some of the language used in describing small and artisanal fisheries and subsidies programs available to these fisheries under the special and differential treatment provision.
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